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 Francis Robinson 
 
     For the hundred years preceeding the Muslim revival of the 
late twentieth century, the Islamic world seemed to be following 
a path of secularization similar to that on which the Western 
Christian world embarked some centuries before. Law derived from 
revelation had been increasingly removed from public life; 
religious knowledge had steadily lost ground in education; more 
and more Muslims had come forward who were Islamic by culture but 
made `rational' calculations about their lives in much the same 
way as Christians formed in the secular West might do. The 
development of this `rationaliality' and rationalization within 
Christianity, according to Max Weber, brought the secular world 
into being.  This essay is concerned to explore how far Weber's 
theory of secularization, which is derived specifically from the 
experience of western Europe, can help us both to make sense of 
this process in Islamic society and, perhaps, to reach some 
understanding of what the measure of secularization might be in 
an Islamic environment.ii 
      Weber's process of secularization is a unique Western 
development, its roots deep in ancient Judaism, and its trunk in 
Protestantism and in the growth of capitalism.  At the heart of 
the process lie the concepts of rationality and rationalization. 
We discern the growth of rationality in increasing human capacity 
to calculate and to control all aspects of life without appeals 
either to traditional norms or to charismatic enthusiasm. As 
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bureaucracies come to embrace all the activities of the economy 
and of the state, opportunities for individual initiative, and 
dependence on traditional loyalties, are reduced. Social 
relationships are rendered steadily more impersonal. As rational 
legal systems, in which lawyers make the law, come more widely to 
be adopted, the hold of sacred traditions and all forms of 
arbitrariness in law is loosened, and individuals contemplate 
their prospects with greater precision.  Society grows more like 
a machine, the individual like a cog in that machine, and human 
actions come more and more to be rationally calculated.  The 
individual gains a growing sense of control over life.iii There 
flow from this substantial consequences for religious 
understanding. 
     There is that famous `disenchantment of the world'; Weber 
uses Schiller's term `entzauberung', meaning literally `the 
driving out of magic from things'. The human being no longer 
dwells in a great enchanted garden. To find direction, and to win 
security in this world and the next, the human being no longer 
needs either to revere or to coerce the spirits; there is no 
longer need to seek salvation through ritualistic, idolatrous or 
sacramental procedures.iv Human beings lose their sense of 
providence in life. `Once upon a time', declares Owen Chadwick in 
surveying the secularization of the European mind, `the wood was 
bewitched, and goblins and fair spirits dwelt in the trunks of 
trees and among the roots. But now the wood is administered by 
the Forestry Commission, and although romantic men may still hear 
a goblin running in the undergrowth and glimpse beauty behind a 
bush, they know when a subjective experience is subjective.'v 
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     Closely associated with disenchantment there is a 
fragmentation of human understanding of the world.  The 
development of science reveals how the world consists of natural 
and cultural processes; humans learn that a religious 
understanding of it is partial, indeed, subjective. The growth of 
a functionally differentiated society leads to the steady 
relegation of religion from public life; it is forced out of the 
realms of economic, political and even social conduct, and into 
the further recesses of private life in which its function is 
merely to interpret and to organize the relationship of the 
individual human being to the sacred.  Thus, the unified vision, 
in which all human experience was understood through Christian 
revelation, is replaced by a fragmented vision in which no one 
set of values either embraces both public and private life, or is 
shared by citizens in their individual existences.vi 
     This is Weber's path of secularization.  From his sociology 
of the great religions he takes us down a path of disenchantment 
which culminates in the sociology of the intelligentsia, amongst 
whom, like as not, each human is a god unto his\herself.vii We 
should note, nevertheless, that Weber's theory is regarded as 
offering only one possible perspective over secularization in the 
West.  It does not explain, so Turner claims, the American case 
of immigration, religious revival and the secularization of 
theological content; nor does it account for the East European 
path of secularization from above.viii Then, again, it does not 
satisfy those heirs of Comte and Durkheim who find religion deep-
seated in humanity and in the consensus which makes up human 
society.  They suspect those who talk of secularization of 
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presupposing some golden age in the past as compared with an 
over-secularized present; they feel they ignore a continuing 
interaction between Christian revelation and Western 
civilization, a continual working and reworking of the Christian 
message through the lives and minds, the societies and 
institutions of Western man.ix 
     These reservations noted, let us see what Weber's theory can 
tell us about secularization in the Islamic world. Our evidence 
will be derived in the main from the Islamic world of South Asia, 
although we shall reach out, where appropriate, to seek parallels 
and comparisons elsewhere. Our approach will be founded on one 
adopted by Peter Berger. In exploring Weber's perspectives of 
disenchantment and fragmentation we shall use Berger's 
distinction between structural secularization, that is the 
evacuation of religion from society's institutions and its 
consequences, and subjective secularization, that is the 
evacuation of the religious from the consciousness of man and its 
consequences.x 
     First, we consider structural secularization, the driving 
out of Islam from the frameworks of law, of knowledge, and of 
power in British India. In the case of law, we find that in the 
century which followed the 1770s the Islamic criminal and civil 
law was first encroached upon, and then replaced outright, by 
British codes of law. By the 1870s the Muslims of British India 
found that their Islamic law, the shari`a, accounted for no more 
than their personal law, that is the law relating to matters such 
as marriage, divorce and inheritance.  Moreover, that law was no 
longer strictly Islamic in its rules of procedure but slowly 
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being reshaped, as Islamic doctrines of strict adherence to 
established authorities were set asise in favour of English 
doctrines of equity and binding precedent, by the procedures of 
that limited form of Weberian qadi-justice, the Anglo-Muhammadan 
law.xi  We can discern fragmentation in at least two senses.  
There was fragmentation between public and private worlds, 
between a public world ruled by law derived from the West, and a 
private world ruled by law derived from Islamic sources.  There 
was also fragmentation between the world of the British courts, 
whether they applied the British codes of public law or the 
Anglo-Muhammadan personal law, and the world of the ulama, the 
traditionally learned men of Islam, who strove to offer as full 
guidance in the ways of the shari`a as they could. Beneath the 
framework of British justice the ulama sustained a limited system 
of Islamic legal guidance represented by institutions such as the 
Dar al-Ifta of the Deoband School and the Amir-i Shari`at 
organization of Phulwari Sharif, Bihar.xii 
     In the case of learning, an entirely new system was erected, 
which owed nothing to Islam. The knowledge taught was knowledge 
which would enable men to work modern bureaucracy, it was not 
knowledge which would make God's revelation through Muhammad work 
more successfully in the world. The peaks of achievement in the 
new system were peaks of achievement in Western scholarship and 
science, which were usually reached in British universities, they 
were not peaks of achievement in tafsir (Quran commentary) or 
fiqh (jurisprudence) to be scaled in Cairo or an-Najaf. Education 
in Islamic knowledge was increasingly relegated to a minor 
position and increasingly became less relevant to the broad 
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purposes of society and state. Here, too, we can discern 
fragmentation. There were differences between government 
educational institutions, which taught Western knowledge in an 
anglicized environment, and Muslim institutions, like Aligarh 
College, which to some degree at least wished to hold Western 
knowledge within a Muslim cultural frame. There were greater 
differences between all such colleges, which produced swelling 
streams of trousered graduates able by and large to think in 
Western terms and to serve the purposes of Western civilization 
and the Islamic madrasas, which produced a dwindling stream, 
relatively at least, of turbaned graduates able to see the world 
only through the prism of revelation.xiii 
     In the case of power, the only association between Islam and 
power which remained after the British abolished Muslim judges, 
or qadis, in the 1860s was the Anglo-Muhammadan law. 
Nevertheless, there did develop an association between Muslims 
and power. At each stage, as the British slowly devolved power on 
Indians between 1909 and 1947, a separate Muslim political 
identity was further entrenched in the modern political framework 
they were fashioning for India.  Muslims gained separate 
electorates; they gained guaranteed numbers of seats; and 
ultimately some won an Islamic state of Pakistan. We seem to 
witness in the first fifty years of twentieth-century British 
India that somewhat paradoxical process, which also took place in 
Victorian Britain, that while the disenchantment of learning and 
other institutions goes on apace the political importance of 
religious remains strong.xiv  Of course, we can also find 
fragmentation in the wake of disenchantment. There was the 
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development of both a secular and a communal framework for 
politics within the colonial state.  More significantly, there 
was the growth of a fundamental distinction between those Muslims 
for whom freedom meant removing the British and taking over the 
framework of the colonial state and its law, either in a secular 
India or in a Muslim Pakistan, and those Muslims for whom the 
only real form of freedom was the imposition of the shari`a, a 
true marriage between law derived from revelation and the 
machinery of the modern state.xv 
     British India, therefore, reveals a moderate structural 
secularization; Islam was to various degrees disentangled from 
the frameworks of law, of learning and of power. Indeed, we might 
understand the situation best in terms of a kind of structural 
dualism. On the one hand, there was the developing fabric of the 
modern colonial state onto which, admittedly, some Muslim 
preferences had been imposed.  On the other, there were the 
residual Islamic institutions of law and learning and the 
political vision which they fostered.  By comparison, Turkey 
between the nineteenth-century reform period of the Tanzimat and 
the death of Ataturk had achieved a total disentangling of Islam 
from the frameworks of law, learning and power. But in Iran, up 
to the abdication of Riza Shah in 1941, or in Egypt, up to the 
Free Officers Revolution of 1952, we must talk more in terms of 
structural dualism along the lines of British India. Indeed, by 
the mid-twentieth century this was the pattern in most of the 
Islamic world.xvi 
     We now turn to consider subjective secularization, the 
disentangling of the religious vision from the consciousness of 
  
8
human beings.  Here, too, we seem to be able to see the 
realization of a Weberian perspective. There seem to be processes 
of disenchantment in the emergence of a protestant or puritan 
Islam. This had its immediate origins in the great movement of 
revival and reform which swept through the Islamic world in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.xvii Barbara Metcalf analyses 
one of its Indian manifestations in her study of the context and 
the emergence of the Deoband school in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. She notes the growth of Islamic practice 
based more firmly on the Quran, the Hadiths and the Shari`a. It 
is an Islam based on scripture; it is one which is rationalizing 
the sense of making religion self-conscious, systematic and based 
on abstract principles. Groups of Muslims come forward who, while 
they do not in the main reject saints and Islamic mysticism 
(sufism), increasingly see themselves as following religious 
practice which is different from that of the sufi shrines, 
indeed, they often define their Islam in contrast to the 
parochial forms of the shrines. Their's is a universal form in 
which Muslims all over India, indeed, all over the Muslim world, 
could share.  It is one, moreover, whose growth and development 
is closely interwoven, as in the emergence of European 
protestantism, with the translation of scripture into the 
vernacular languages and the harnessing of the printing press to 
the spreading of religious knowledge.xviii 
     Thus, there came to be established among the forms of Indian 
Islam a puritan form, which in its extreme manifestation of the 
Ahl-i Hadiths (People of the Traditions) was stripped to the bare 
essentials of Quran and Hadiths.  These puritan Muslims began to 
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dispense with the great network of saints and ancestors through 
whom they once came close to God. They came to live less in a 
world penetrated through and through by sacred beings and forces. 
God was firmly transcendant and humans had no comfort, no 
guidance except God's revelation through Muhammad to help them 
live in this world so that they might be judged favourably in the 
next.  These Muslims increasingly seemed to find the world a 
cold, bleak, disenchanted place. It is a process which in 
protestant Christianity many see to be preparing the way for 
secularization. Once the channels between humankind and God had 
been narrowed down to His Word, belief in God became dependent on 
the credibility of that Word. Once that credibility was 
undermined, the floodgates of secularization were open.xix 
     We do not wish to suggest that the outcome for Islam will be 
the same, only that there are some similarities in the path 
travelled. For the moment, we would note that the emergence of a 
puritan Islam is not confined to India but is also to be found in 
other parts of the Islamic World. The closest parallel is 
probably the Muhammadiyah of Indonesia.  A less close one is that 
of the Salafiyah of North Africa, whose assertion of the ideal of 
a reformed Islam as against that of a saintly Islam in the 
context of the urbanization of Algeria has been set out by Ernest 
Gellner in his somewhat misleadingly entitled essay, `The unknown 
Apollo of Biskra'. Some of the same drives and concerns, on the 
other hand, have also been expressed through the framework of a 
sufi order as in the case of the Nurcular of Turkey.xx 
     If we can see disenchantment in the processes of subjective 
secularization, we can also see fragmentation and growing 
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conflict of world views.  The very emergence of the new puritan 
Islam in the towns and qasbahs of nineteenth-century India led to 
bitter conflict with those for whom the world was still 
enchanted; it led to those endless battles over behaviour at 
saints' shrines which Deobandis and Barelvis have carried with 
them from India to Pakistan to the towns and cities of midlands 
and northern Britain.xxi It also led to conflict, often no less, 
bitter, in letter, tract, newspaper and debate, among the 
reforming sects themselves. Then, there was further conflict 
between the various traditionalist groups and those called 
Islamic modernists.  Islamic modernists grew from the same stock 
as the puritan traditionalists but strove somehow to hold 
elements of Western knowledge and understanding within an Islamic 
frame.  Their line began with the great theological and 
historiographical efforts of Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Aligarh 
movement. It moved through the crises of pan-Islamism from the 
late nineteenth century to the great Indian movement of 1919-24 
to preserve the Turkish caliphate. Then it came to a peak, on the 
one hand in Abul Kalam Azad and the genesis of the idea of a 
composite Hindu-Muslim Indian nationalism as the political 
counterpart to a continuing Islamic universalism, and on the 
other hand in Muhammad Iqbal and the genesis of the idea of the 
Islamic state of Pakistan as the realistic answer to the 
political failure of Islamic universalism.xxii  Further development 
led to Fazlur Rahman, that most creative of Pakistani thinkers, 
who was once head of the Islamic Research Institute established 
under his country's constitution but whose challenging thought 
led him to die in exile on the shores of Lake Michigan.xxiii 
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     All these thinkers, whether traditionalist or modernist, 
understood the world within an Islamic frame.  Their vision of 
world history was bound by Islam: the Quran was their starting 
point.  But, there also came those who espoused visions which 
challenged Islam as an all-inclusive moral, social and political 
system, men whose understandings of the world were distinctly 
secular in a Western sense.  There are those, like K.M. Ashraf 
and Sajjad Zaheer and other supporters of the Progressive Writers 
Movement of the 1930s and 1940s, who espoused a primarily 
socialist vision of progress.xxiv There are also those, both in 
India and in Pakistan, who have espoused a nationalist vision of 
past and future: there is Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's transient vision 
of five thousand years of Pakistani history; there is also 
Mushirul Hasan's vigorous advocacy on behalf of a secular 
nationalist future for India in general and India's Muslims in 
particular.  For such men Islam is no longer the explanation of 
the beginning and end of things; it is just another form of 
culture.xxv 
     This process of fragmentation and conflict, of the emergence 
of multiplying strands of conflicting thought among Muslims, 
which come eventually to include those that challenge Islam as 
total ideology, can be seen yet more distinctly in the world 
outside South Asia. Here the nationalism of Ataturk and Riza Shah 
Pahlavi stood both more confident and better developed.  Here the 
socialism of Nasserite Egypt and Baathist Iraq was more fully 
thought through and realised.  But here, of course, Islam was 
only threatened by Western domination from without, as opposed to 
the South Asian Muslim's fear of the pincer threat of Western 
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domination from without and Hindu domination from within. 
     Thus, we find within the Islamic world much evidence of the 
growth of secularization along the lines that Weber traced in 
Christian Europe. Disenchantment and fragmentation takes place in 
structural terms; it also takes place in subjective terms. From 
almost any Western point of view the signs of secularization are 
plentiful. Yet, one reflection gives pause for thought about just 
how much weight we should attach to what we find.  This 
secularization was a consequence of the projection of Western 
capital and power into the Islamic world from 1800 onwards. The 
steady disenchantment and fragmentation of the structures of law, 
learning and power was either the direct result of the impact of 
Western imperialism, as in British India, or as in Turkey and 
Iran the result of deliberate attempts to copy European ways and 
institutions to make the state strong enough to keep the 
foreigner out.  These processes were in large part forced on 
Muslim societies from outside or imposed from above; they were 
only to some extent the result of new economic and social 
formations within these societies. We could, moreover, argue 
along similar lines in dealing with those Muslims who espouse 
secular ideologies which deny the all-inclusive vision of Islam. 
 That they were able to espouse these ideologies seems mainly a 
function of the extent to which they were caught up within a web 
of Western economic influence, power and thought. They embraced a 
Western secularism rather than developing an Islamic one. 
     Some might counter this reflection by pointing to those 
processes of religious change in the recent Islamic past which 
bear comparison with similar processes in Christian history. We 
  
13
think of that development of a Muslim puritanism out of the 
internal dynamics of Islamic civilization which developed a 
modernist aspect as it came into contact with the West. There are 
certainly aspects of rationalization here, aspects of Weberian 
disenchantment and fragmentation. But they do not seem as yet to 
threaten to undermine the Islamic world view from within.  
Indeed, these processes seem more aspects of religious change, a 
reduction in the sufi element in Islam and an increasing emphasis 
on the law.  They seem as much spurs to find a new relationship 
between revelation and history as a notable manifestation of 
secularization within an Islamic environment. It may be that this 
is in large part because Muslims have contemplated the meaning of 
Western knowledge in the context of overwhelming Western power, 
which has made it particularly difficult critically to explore 
their own world and to risk turning it upside down. More time, 
perhaps, is needed.  On the other hand, it may be that there are 
limits to what a theory of secularization derived from the 
experience of the Christian world can tell us about religious 
change in the Islamic world. 
     So we turn from exploring the potential of Weber's theory of 
secularization in the Islamic context to considering the problem 
of secularization in Islamic terms, in fact, to considering the 
problem as Weber might have done, in terms of the unique 
`developmental history' of Islam, that is, in terms of the 
development of Islam as a form of rationalization of world 
views.xxvi We start from the position that the orientation of Islam 
to the world is different from that of Christianity, and thus its 
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pattern of development will be so too.  As Weber suggests, Islam 
is particularly concerned with this world.xxvii It is much more 
concerned with how men behave than with what they believe, in 
fact, all that they need believe is contained in the one sentence 
of the shahada, the confession of faith.  In most of its 
fundamental rituals Islam concentrates on the creation and 
support of a community of believers on earth.  There is to be 
communal prayer, communal fasting, alms-giving to support the 
community, pilgrimage to affirm the community. Indeed, a Muslim 
life is primarily significant as being lived as part of the 
community, that best community, as the Quran declares, raised up 
for men.xxviii A prime function of the community is to support the 
power which will enforce the shari`a. This is ideally, though not 
wholly in fact, the distilled essence of the Quran and the life 
of the Prophet which offers guidance for every aspect of human 
life.  It is ideally, and certainly in fact, the constitution of 
the Muslim community, as Gibb describes it, which stands `for all 
that the Constitution stands for the United States of America and 
more [check]'.xxix It embodies both the patterns of behaviour which 
the Muslim should strive to realize in his own life and the 
patterns of behaviour which the state should try to impose upon 
him. Muslim society is Islamic to the extent that it follows the 
shari`a. Muslim states are Islamic to the extent that they 
support the shari`a. Here we have a possible criterion of 
secularization in Islamic societies and states; if they are 
Islamic to the extent to which the shari`a is followed and 
applied then they are secular to the extent that it is not 
followed and applied. 
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     Let us see what we can learn if we use this criterion in the 
case of South Asia. We have already noted that by the 1870s the 
application of the shari`a in British India had been reduced to 
the personal law, and that in its distorted Anglo-Muhammadan 
form.  Nevertheless, there were important developments in its 
shape and in its support up to the mid-twentieth century.  
Throughout the history of Islam in South Asia, as in that of 
other Muslim societies, the shari`a had tolerated the continuing 
existence of customary laws, the non-Islamic laws of new, and not 
so new, entrants to the Islamic milieu.  But, by the time of the 
Shariat Application Act of 1937, almost all toleration of these 
customary laws came to an end. As far as their personal lives 
were concerned, Indian Muslims lived under the shari`a alone.xxx 
Then, in the past, the reach of the state, particularly into 
rural communities, had always been limited; so had been its 
capacity to apply the law.  But the superior machinery of the 
colonial state, and later of the national states of India and 
Pakistan, was able to bring the shari`a much closer to the lives 
of each individual Muslim. By the mid-twentieth century Muslim 
personal law, that point where the Quran is most explicit, that 
point where Muslims feel, in Anderson's telling phrase, that the 
shari`a partakes most intimately in the very warp and woof of 
their lives,xxxi had come to be more completely applied than ever 
before in South Asia.  Similar developments can be traced in 
Malaysia and Indonesia, for instance, and even in Saudi 
Arabia.xxxii 
     If we now turn to examine how the shari`a might have been 
followed, it seems that, up to the eighteenth century, although 
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many knew they were Muslims, not so many knew how to behave as 
the holy law might direct. Islamic knowledge, knowledge of what 
Muslims should and should not do, was hard to come by.xxxiii We 
know, as Bulliet, Geertz, Eaton and many others have 
demonstrated, that through much of the Islamic world the process 
of Islamization, the patterning of society after some version of 
the shari`a, has been painfully slow. Many centuries divide the 
first confession of faith from the wide mastery of the scriptural 
tradition.xxxiv We also know that the early nineteenth century 
movements of revival and reform in Kerala, in Bengal, and in 
Northern India, all suggest how large the gap was between the 
practice of rural and even qasbah society and the preference of 
an alert, reforming Islam. But the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries have seen unprecedented drives, fuelled by continuing 
movements of reform, by vast increases in the availability of 
Islamic knowledge, and by favourable economic and social changes, 
which have brought Muslims to live lives closer to the shari`a.xxxv 
Just as the application of the personal law by the state is more 
rigorous and more widespread than before, so equally is knowledge 
of the shari`a, and perhaps the following of it, in Indo-Muslim 
society at large.  This, too, is not a development confined to 
South Asia. It is also expressed, for instance, in the popularity 
of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout much of the Middle East, 
and, in spite of the determinedly secular face of the Turkish 
state, or perhaps because of it, in the extraordinary thirst for 
Islamic knowledge among the Turkish people in recent times. It 
is, in fact, a feature of the late-twentieth century revival of 
Islam that has touched every Muslim society.xxxvi 
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     We are left with contrasting perspectives.  If we take that 
derived from Weber's theory of secularization, it does seem that 
Indo-Muslim society, indeed Muslim societies in general, has 
advanced some way down the path of disenchantment and 
fragmentation, the path of secularization. But, if we respect the 
integrity of the `developmental history' of Islam as a 
rationalization of world views, we have a picture which is more 
complex. Certainly, the exercise of European power in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries drove the shari`a out of the 
public and into the private sphere of Muslim life. Certainly, it 
undermined the Islamic world view of Muslim elites.  Yet, on the 
other hand, the modern state and the modern technology, which the 
European brought, helped to draw many Muslims closer to the 
shari`a than before. In recent times, moreover, the retreat of 
the European, and some failures of the state machinery left 
behind, have often been accompanied by a reassertion of Islamic 
world view and a reinstatement of the shari`a in public life. A 
continuing process of islamization, following Weber's 
understanding of developmental history, seems as notable a 
feature of recent Islamic developments, as one of secularization, 
following Weber's theory of secularization. 
 ***** 
     Reviewing the argument of this essay some thirteen years 
after it was first written, and in the light of recent 
developments in the Muslim world, there is an additional 
reflection.  We have noted above that in terms of the unique 
developmental history of Islam the faith was particularly 
concerned with this world. This is, of course, true if it is 
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approached in a sense that veers in an orientalist/essentialist 
direction. But, if we consider the effective practice of Islam in 
many societies over much of the past 1400 years, it has had 
powerful other-worldly dimensions. Most believers have attended 
saints' shrines and implored the saint to intercede for them with 
God. 
     The great event of Islamic history over the past two hundred 
years has been the attack by the movement of revival and reform 
on all ideas of saintly intercession for humankind with God and 
the new emphasis on the this-worldly dimension of the faith. The 
many movements of Islamic reassertion have been, and are, 
impelled by the consciousness of the need to act in this world to 
achieve salvation. There is evidence that these manifestations of 
`willed Islam' have come to develop new strands in Muslim 
consciousness that bear resemblance to similar outgrowths of 
European protestantism. There is a new sense of empowerment that 
comes with the knowledge that it is humanity that fashions the 
world. There is a new sense of personal autonomy and individual 
possibility that comes with the knowledge that individuals are 
able to make choices. There is a steady transfer of the symbols 
and centres of meaning in life from the signs of God and the 
friends of God to the mundane things of life - family, home, 
love, sex, food. There is the `inward turn' as the individual 
comes to examine and to reflect upon the self.  In sum the 
individual becomes more and more focused on earthly activity and 
earthly fulfilment. 
     If we take Islam as widely practised through time as the 
basis of our understanding of the developmental history of Islam, 
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strands are emerging which would appear to point in similar 
directions to those of protestant Christianity. We recognise, of 
course, that the new individualism derives some of its impetus 
from the influence of the West as well as having firm roots in 
this-worldly Islam. This said, there is growing tension between 
demands  for individual fulfilment and the requirements of 
obligation to community, a tension felt most acutely in many 
Muslim societies by women. It is worth considering whether this 
tension may not be at the cusp of a process of secularization in 
Muslim societies.xxxvii 
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